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Abstract 
The ghost of Berlin Conference (1884-1885) that partitioned Africa into specific spheres of influence has 
continued to haunt Africa many years after colonialism through neo-colonial ties thereby consolidating and 
reinforcing the balkanisation of African economies. The principal findings of this study, therefore, are that the 
regional economic integration in Africa has been largely undermined by one, overlapping memberships; two, 
numerous subgroupings; and three, proliferation of regional economic blocs. The resultant effect is 
differentiation, fragmentation, decimation or disintegration in Africa. The paper recommends that there is need 
to problematise neo-functionalism and elevate post-neo-functionalism as a viable option for African integration. 
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1. Introduction 
Regional economic integration is the intersection between neo-mercantilism and neo-functionalism representing 
a shift from economic nationalism to economic regionalism or from nation-state to region-state (Aniche, Okeke, 
and Ukaegbu 2009). Nweke (2000) further states that this pervasive trend of regional integration has led to the 
emergence of a multipolar global economy and formation of regional economic blocs. However, as Ake (1981) 
noted the idea of regional integration as a means or strategies of collective self-reliance for promoting economic 
integration and cooperation has been around in Africa for a long time like the pre-independence East African 
Community (EAC).  
In fact, Igwe (2002) and Echezona (1998) note that Kwame Nkrumah was the first African leader to advocate for 
regional integration in Africa in the form of African Continental Government or United States of Africa, and as 
well laid the philosophical foundation to the current regional economic blocs in Africa. Africa regionalism, thus, 
flows from the pan-Africanist philosophical foundations of Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Nnamdi Azikiwe 
and others culminating to the establishment of Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 now African Union 
(AU) since 2001 and Abuja Treaty of 1991 that gave birth to African Economic Community (AEC). African 
regionalism is, thus, rooted in pan-Africanism.   
However, despite decades of regional economic integration in Africa, scholars have noted that numerous 
obstacles remain, making it difficult for Africa to achieve successful economic integration. These obstacles and 
difficulties include neo-colonial ties, politico-ideological differences, export-oriented primary products of 
African states; disparity in size and development of African states; fear of domination or monopolization of 
benefits; adverse activities of multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in Africa; historical, political, 
economic and vertical linkages of African economies to Western economies; structural dependence of African 
economies to Western economies; intractable civil strife and the attendant refugee crises and internal 
displacements (Ake 1991, Echezona 1998, Kennes 1999, Ojo 1999, Nweke 2000, Page 2000, Okeke and Aniche 
2012). 
Ezeanyika (2006) points out that the proliferation of regional economic integration or cooperation in Africa that 
share similar or overlapping objectives and functions duplicate their activities leading to uneconomical use of 
available scarce financial and human capital (Kennes 1999). But few systematic inquiries had been undertaken 
or investigation made to ascertain the level of damage caused by incidence of proliferation, fractionalisation or 
decimation of regional economic integration in Africa into numerous strands of subgroups and the resulting 
overlapping or multiple memberships of African states in the regional economic communities (RECs) and other 
trans-regional organizations or cross-regional groups. 
However, our focal point in this study will be on the role of African Economic Community (AEC) towards 
coordinating other regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa with the hope of achieving ultimately 
continent-wide single market and possibly a continent-wide economic and monetary union. These major regional 
economic blocs in Africa constituting RECs include ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, CENSAD, 
IGAD and AMU. This paper therefore concludes one, that overlapping or multiple memberships of regional 
economic groups has weakened regional economic integration in Africa; and two, that proliferation of regional 
economic groups and subgroups has undermined or loosened regional economic ties in Africa.  
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2. Post-neo-functionalism and Crisis of African Integration 
All the hitherto existing theories of integration or neo-liberal institutionalism such as functionalism, neo-
functionalism, complex interdependence, intergovermentalism, etc. are Euro-centric, western, parochial, or 
tailor-made for European integration, and therefore, not apt to explain the defects, failures and drawbacks of 
African integration. Thus, there is need to deconstruct them in the search for new theory of African integration or 
in the quest for paradigm shift for African integration. 
Post-neo-functionalism or post-neo-nationalism is not a theory of nihilism, that is, it does not advocate the total 
abolition or condemnation of regional integrationism or regionalism. It only says that Africa is not yet ready for 
integration particularly in the areas of economy and politics, or put in another way that African states are yet to 
mature for economic and political integration. Also, post-neo-functionalism does not align itself with Marxism 
or neo-Marxist dependency theories that advocates delinking. However, post-neo-functionalism may be nearer to 
protectionism, nationalism or mercantilism than Marxism and neo-Marxism, and still, distinct. Actually, post-
neo-functionalism is a synthesis, a combination, a hybrid or a blend of neo-nationalism, post-nationalism and 
humanism. Therefore, post-neo-functionalism is a composite of neo-nationalism, post-nationalism and 
humanism. This requires further explanation (Aniche 2015). 
For example, neo-nationalism is a new form of nationalism mixed with protectionism. Therefore, neo-
nationalism is a composite of political nationalism and economic nationalism. In other words, neo-nationalism is 
a resurgence or a new wave or a revival of nationalism or nationalist movement that characterized the struggle 
against colonialism or the fight for decolonization in Africa. But now, neo-nationalism is geared towards the 
struggle against neo-colonialism, rentierism and dependency as well as to tackle the pervasive protracted, 
intractable and perennial conflicts in Africa that have rendered it a crisis region or troubled region.  
Therefore, there are two main elements of neo-nationalism, namely; modern political nationalism and economic 
nationalism. Political nationalism is predominantly the political sphere of neo-nationalism, while protectionism 
or economic nationalism, on the other hand, is the economic aspect. Modern political nationalism is targeted at 
facilitating national integration or national unity through nation-building or state-building in order to eliminate or 
at least ameliorate internal conflicts or civil wars in Africa. This entails solving the problems of ethnic 
chauvinism and religious bigotry, or resolving national question of ethno-religious violence that pose serious or 
enormous security challenges in Africa.  
The point being made is that a country that cannot achieve unity and integration at the national level cannot 
logically pursue, advocate or promote integration at the regional level because charity begins at home. But 
African leaders want their own charity to begin abroad. This is a clog in the wheel of African integration. 
Therefore, neo-nationalism aspect of post-neo-functionalism is advocating or proposing that integration should 
proceed from or start at the national level (national integration) then gradually and naturally proceed to regional 
level (regional integration), and probably ultimately moved to global level (global integration or globalisation).  
Economic nationalism, on the other hand, advocates for not total closure of the economy but strategic closure of 
the economy before opening up in future when the African states must have been industrialised or attained the 
level of competitive advantage with other economies. Strategic closure here means imposing tariff barriers or 
total ban on certain commodities that will be instrumental for African states to attain industrialization and 
national development. This entails protecting home industries against adverse competition from abroad. Check 
the history of today’s industrialised countries and you will notice that all of them including Britain, Germany, 
US, etc., and the newly industrialized countries (NICs) like China, Asian Tigers, etc., have all at one point in 
time practised protectionism before preaching free trade and liberalism. Therefore, protectionism or economic 
nationalism should be targeted more on regulating or restricting free trade, that is, importation of commodities, 
and movement of migrant or expatriate workers than on free movement of capital in terms of foreign direct 
investment. It is yet to be known a country or a continent which climbed the ladder of industrialization through 
regional integration.  
The point being made is that African states are not yet ready for regional integration for the fact they are being 
confronted by rentierism, mono-cultural economy, primary producing economy coupled with consumeric 
appetite for imported or foreign goods, and as well as being decimated by internal armed conflicts like civil 
wars, ethno-religious violence, sectarian violence and terrorism. Most of European countries that adopted neo-
functional approach to regional integration that resulted to European Union (EU) have transcended problems of 
national unity, de-industrialisation, national insecurity, etc. Almost all the African states are operating at the 
same level of economy or productive activities, and therefore have nothing to bring to the table. This is the 
reason why there has been minimal achievement or progress in regional economic integration in Africa. Put 
simply, African economies as presently constituted have nothing to protect because the present situation 
reinforces international division of labour or relationships of dependence, rather than relationships of 
interdependence. As such, those who do not produce have nothing to protect. 
Post-nationalism, the next element of post-neo-functionalism, transcends nationalism. Therefore, post-neo-
functionalism in this regard advocates regional cooperation in matters of security at the onset which is an 
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immediate or short-term strategy for tackling the enormous security challenges in various states in Africa at the 
continental or regional level. The successes of ECOWAS, AU and the recent combined efforts or forces by the 
four neighbouring countries of Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroun to combat terrorism are all good examples. 
In other words, it advocates that regional security cooperation should precede regional economic integration, and 
even regional integration in political sphere. This complements neo-nationalism insistent that Africa is not yet 
ready or mature for regional economic and political integration and should proceed with national integration 
until such a time the continent is ready for regional integration or integration at the regional level in the areas of 
economy and politics. 
Humanism is an aspect of post-neo-functionalism which advocates that once the continent is ready for 
integration in the matters of economy and politics, that such regional integration should not only be allowed to 
evolve naturally and gradually but should as well be humane, humanistic, man-centred, people-driven or private 
sector-led in order to facilitate people-to-people integration and bottom-up integration rather than the current 
state-driven, state-centric, top-bottom integration, public sector-led integration or inter-governmental integration 
of neo-functionalism. The role of the state or government should only be to regulate or facilitate. In other words, 
the role of the states in African integration at this level should be facilitative. One of the merits of post-neo-
functionalism is that it does not support artificialisation of regional integration rather it suggests that 
regionalisation should be allowed to evolve naturally and gradually. Post-neo-functionalism does not advocate 
artificial and rapid creation or fast-tracking of regional integration. The argument is that once African integration 
evolve naturally and gradually at its own pace as driven by the African people and facilitated by the governments 
of African states, the incidence of multiple, duplicative and overlapping memberships, and subgroupings would 
not arise (Aniche 2014).  
 
3. African Economic Community (AEC), Subgroupings and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in 
Africa 
There are multiple regional blocs in Africa known as Regional Economic Communities (RECs), many of which 
have overlapping memberships. The RECs consist primarily of trade blocs and, in some cases, political and 
military cooperation. Most of these RECs form the ‘pillars’ of AEC and several of these pillars also contain 
subgroups with tighter customs and/or monetary unions. It is often hoped that due to high proportion of overlap 
in memberships of these pillars of AEC that it is likely that some states with several memberships will eventually 
drop out of one or more of RECS. These pillars and their corresponding subgroups are as follows in Table 1. 
Other regional blocs like Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), Economic Community of the Great Lakes 
Countries (CEPGL), Indian Ocean Commission (COI), Liptako-Gourma Authority (LGA), Mano River Union 
(MRU), etc., are not included in the RECs or pillars of AEC, because (i) they do not participate in AEC and (ii) 
they are mainly trans-regional or cross-regional in that their memberships extend beyond Africa or include other 
non-African states. For example, GAFTA includes mostly Middle Eastern states (Okeke and Aniche 2012).  
At this juncture, there is need to examine the origin and membership of each Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs). For example, Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD) was established in February 1998 by six 
countries, namely, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya, Mali, Niger and Sudan, but its membership has grown to twenty 
eight, namely, Central African Republic (1999) Eritrea (1999) Djibouti (2000), Morocco (2001), Nigeria (2001), 
Somalia (2001), Tunisia (2001), Benin (2002), Togo (2002), Cote d’Ivoire (2004), Guinea-Bissau (2004), 
Liberia (2004), Ghana (2005), Sierra Leone (2005), Comoros (2007), Guinea (2007), Kenya (2008), Mauritania 
(2008), Sao Tome and principle (2008). 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) was formed in December 1994 replacing a 
Preferential Trade Area, which had existed since 1981. Currently, COMESA has nineteen member states which 
include Burundi (December 21, 1981); Comoros (December 21, 1981); Democratic Republic of Congo 
(December 21, 1981); Djibouti (December 21, 1981); Egypt (January 6, 1999); Eritrea (1994); Ethiopia 
(December 21, 1981); Kenya (December 21, 1981); Libya (June 3, 2005); Madagascar (December 21, 1981); 
Malawi (December 21, 1981); Mauritius (December 21, 1981); Rwanda (December 21, 1981); Seychelles 
(2001); Sudan (December 21, 1981); Swaziland (December 21, 1981); Uganda (December 21, 1981); and 
Zimbabwe (December 21, 1981). 
The Treaty establishing the East African Community (EAC) was signed on November 30, 1999 and entered into 
force on July 7, 2000 following its ratification by the three original partner states, which are Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania. Rwanda and Burundi acceded to the EAC Treaty on June 18, 2007 and became full members of the 
Community with effect from July 1, 2007. The EAC was originally set up in 1967, however; disagreements 
between the original-founding members, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania led to its collapse in 1977 (Okeke and 
Aniche 2012).  
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was established in 1985 by ten founding states, 
namely, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of 
the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and principle, while Angola joined in 1999. 
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Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional group of fifteen West African states 
founded on May 28, 1975 with the signing of the treaty of Lagos. In 1976, Cape Verde joined ECOWAS and in 
December 2000, Mauritania withdrew having announced its intention to do so in December 1999. Currently, the 
member states of ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, while Guinea was suspended after 2008 coup 
d’etat (Okeke and Aniche 2012). 
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was founded in 1986 by the following founding 
states; Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia Sudan and Uganda, while Eritrea joined in 1993. Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) was formed in Lusaka, Zambia on April 1, 1980 as Southern African 
Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) following the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration by the 
following founding states, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe while Madagascar and Namibia joined (March 31, 1990). When SADCC was transformed into SADC 
on August 17, 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia four other states, namely, South Africa (August 30, 1994), Mauritius 
(August 28, 1995), Democratic Republic of Congo (September 8, 1997) and Seychelles (September 8, 1997) 
joined, however, Madagascar was suspended after the coup d’etat. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) was 
formed in 1989 by five founding states, namely, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. For a 
comparison of these regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa see Table 2 below. 
 
4. Subgroupings, Differentiation, Decimation and Fragmentation of Regional Economic Communities in 
Africa 
There is, indeed, high incidence of proliferation of regional economic groups and subgroupings, or even trans-
regional or cross-regional and sub-global groupings in Africa. As such some member states in these economic 
blocs are not geographically contagious, coupled with absence of historical ties among the members of these 
economic groups. In order to move closer or sustain closer ties with historically linked countries member states 
resort to forming several subgroups among themselves which is evident in ECCAS, ECOWAS and SADC (see 
Table 1). A cursory look at the memberships of some of these subgroups shows that most of them share similar 
colonial experience in terms of past colonial rulers (as shown in Table 3 below). 
The Table 3 shows that in the subgroups, most of the memberships are drawn from states that have the same past 
colonial ruler, and thus, the same linguistic appellation. For example, in the case of the Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) a subgroup of ECCAS; it is only Equatorial Guinea that was colonized 
by Spain others were colonized by France and are Francophone countries. As regard to the memberships of West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) a subgroup of ECOWAS, with exception of Guinea-Bissau 
which was colonized by Portugal and a Lusophone country, the less were colonised by France and therefore are 
Francophone countries. For example, UEMOA’s common currency, CFA Franc, is guaranteed by the French 
treasury (Okeke and Aniche 2012).  
Whereas, West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) another subgroup of ECOWAS draws its memberships from 
English speaking or Anglophone countries that were colonized by Britain except Guinea that is Francophone 
country as she was colonized by France. Guinea has historically been recalcitrant towards France. For instance, 
Ojo (1999) notes that Cote d’Ivoire along with UEMOA members has been resisting phasing the Francophone 
Community into the larger ECOWAS which has resulted to a deadlock. South African Customs Union (SACU), 
a subgroup of Southern African Development Community (SADC) draws all its memberships from Britain and 
South Africa. 
In all of these subgroups discussed above colonial legacy engendered from many years of historical ties both in 
economic and political spheres is responsible for forming these subgroups. Even in the case of European Union 
(i.e. from ECSC and EEC) age long historical ties was responsible in bringing these continental European 
countries together before it spread to other parts of Europe. This is what Ejiofor (1981) meant when he points out 
that most of the regional organisations were sponsored, guided and promoted from outside Africa for purpose of 
perpetuating the presence of neo-colonialism in Africa, rather than serving as integrating factor in African 
politics. These regional groups constituted rival and divergent blocs which worked implicitly for destruction of 
African unity (Okeke and Aniche 2012).    
However, one major problem of subgroupings in the African regional economic communities is that it 
undermines the commitment and allegiance of those African states towards the regional bodies. For example, in 
the case of ECCAS countries Tables 4 and 5 show that there are more economic ties between CEMAC countries 
in terms of trade relations than with non-CEMAC countries. For details see Tables 4 and 5 below. Table 4 shows 
that one CEMAC country Chad and one non-CEMAC country, Dem. Rep. of Congo is among the top five 
countries Cameroon a CEMAC country exports to; while Equatorial Guinea another CEMAC country is the only 
ECCAS Country in top five countries Cameroon imports from.  
Table 5 indicates that only one CEMAC country, Cameroon is in the top five countries, that Central African 
Republic (CAR), a CEMAC country exports to, while Cameroon and Republic of Congo are the two CEMAC 
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countries in top five countries, Central African Republic imports from. In the case of SADC countries, Table 6 
shows that there is more economic ties between SACU countries in terms of trade relations than with non-SACU 
countries (Okeke and Aniche 2012).   
Therefore, Table 6 shows that a SACU country occupies the second position with 10.2% out of the top five 
countries Botswana exports to and first position with 83.5% out of the top five countries, Botswana imports 
from. In the case of ECOWAS countries, common currency, that is, CFA Franc, which even transcends 
UEMOA, is a factor bringing them closer to themselves than WAMZ countries. The point being made is that 
subgroupings in African regional economic communities is undermining or loosening regional economic ties 
among member state by tightening the economic ties between members of subgroups. In others words, as 
subgroupings move member states of these subgroups into closer ties, or pull them together, the same 
subgroupings move their members further apart or away from other members of the same regional economic 
communities but different subgroups. 
In search of stronger economic ties and avenues for market, many of them resort to forming or entering other 
regional economic groups. The result of this is the proliferation of regional economic blocs in Africa leading to 
unnecessary duplication, overlapping and multiple memberships. The basis for stronger and successful regional 
economic integration is weakened or loosened. The implication of the above is that AEC has failed to achieve or 
complete part of the second stage of strengthening the intra-REC integration or subgroups merging two years 
after the year (2007) it had proposed to do so (Okeke and Aniche 2012). 
 
5. Proliferation, Overlapping Memberships and Regional Economic Integration or Disintegration in 
Africa 
One major incidence of proliferation of regional groups and subgroupings or even trans-regional or cross-
regional groups is overlapping or multiple memberships of African states in various economic groups. For 
details of this multiple memberships of African states in various regional economic communities in Africa see 
Table 7 below. 
From the Table 7, Kenya is the only African state with membership in the four out of the eight regional 
economic communities (RECs) in Africa, namely COMESA, EAC, CEN-SAD and IGAD. While, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Djibouti Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda belong to three regional economic 
communities (RECs) in Africa. Thirty one other African states belong to two regional economic groups in Africa 
whereas fifteen other AEC countries belong to one regional economic blocs although some of them may still 
belong to other subgroups or trans-regional or cross-regional groups (Okeke and Aniche 2012). 
The imports of the above are lack of commitment, conflicting obligations and allegiance coupled with problem 
of fulfilling financial and other obligations. For example, how can poor countries like Eritrea, Burundi, Rwanda 
and Djibouti be able to meet their obligations in these three regional economic communities (RECs), and at the 
same time been able to shoulder the financial burden resulting from financing their officials to attend and 
participate in the meetings. This is exactly what Ezeanyika (2006) is pointing at by insisting that proliferation of 
regional economic groupings in Africa leads to uneconomical use of available scarce financial and human 
resources.  
In other words, there is likely to be poor commitment to some if not all of these regional economic communities 
(RECs) resulting from multiple memberships of African states in which functions are duplicated and resources 
wasted. For instance, what is rational behind memberships of many ECOWAS countries in the CEN-SAD when 
their common aspirations can be better carried out or derived from their membership of ECOWAS where they 
would rather concentrate their efforts instead of dissipating their collective efforts in the CEN-SAD. Ditto, with 
many members of COMESA or ECCAS who belong to the same CEN-SAD as well as the case with members of 
SADC that belong to COMESA (Okeke and Aniche 2012). 
For example, despite her memberships of four regional economic groups in Africa, Kenya still maintain a much 
closer economic ties with members of East African Community (EAC) like Uganda and Tanzania to which she 
exports most of her products (see, Table 8 below). Ditto with Zimbabwe that belongs to SADC and COMESA, 
but maintain closer economic ties with SADC countries, mainly (see Table 9 below). 
From the Table 9, three SADC countries, namely, South Africa, Mozambique and Botswana make the top five 
countries Zimbabwe exports to and imports from. While, no COMESA country featured in the top five countries 
either in the exports or imports of Zimbabwe. One could only imagine what would have been the case if 
Zimbabwe, Kenya and other African countries had concentrated their collective efforts in one regional economic 
blocs. Perhaps, in the case of Kenya and Zimbabwe more EAC countries and SADC countries would have 
featured in the top five countries. Single membership would therefore make the task of harmonising inter-RECs 
policies easier for African Economic Community (AEC). 
Take for example, Rwanda that belongs to three regional economic communities (RECs), namely, COMESA, 
EAC and ECCAS. Rwanda maintains strong economic ties with Kenya which belongs to COMESA, EAC, 
ECCAS and IGAD; Democratic Republic of Congo that belongs to SADC, COMESA and ECCAS; Uganda 
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which belongs to COMESA, EAC and IGAD; and finally, Tanzania that belongs to SADC and EAC. Kenya, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and Tanzania feature in the top five countries, Rwanda either imports 
from or exports to (see Table 10 for details). 
The implication of the above study is that overlapping or multiple memberships of regional economic 
communities (RECs) in Africa has weakened regional economic integration in Africa. But with announcement of 
the African Free Trade Area (AFTA) of the tripartite summit of the heads of EAC-SADC-COMESA on October 
22, 2008, there is hope that African Economic Community (AEC) will be able to use the opportunity to 
galvanize other RECs towards achieving the second stage goal of strengthening of intra-REC integration and 
inter-REC harmonisation. However, it still remains a hope that is yet to materialize and given the fact that this 
second stage is two years behind the set out target, one would not, but agree with us that it is an indicator that the 
less of the set out targets may not be achieved by AEC come 2017, 2019, 2023, 2028 and finally 2034 (Okeke 
and Aniche 2012). 
 
6. Conclusion 
We have been able, in the course of this study, to conclude that, one, proliferation of regional economic groups 
and subgroups has loosened regional economic ties in Africa; and two, that overlapping or multiple memberships 
of regional economic communities (RECs) has weakened regional economic integration in Africa. The ultimate 
resultant effect of the above findings is that AEC is confronted with fragmentation, decimation, fractionalisation, 
differentiation and disintegration rather than regionalisation, cooperation and integration in Africa (Okeke and 
Aniche 2012). 
The point being made is that the ghost of Berlin Conference (1884-1885) that partitioned Africa into specific 
spheres of influence has continued to haunt Africa many years after colonialism through neo-colonial ties 
consolidating and reinforcing the fragmentation of African economies into several regional blocs, subgroupings 
trans-regional or cross-regional groups and sub-global groups. France, particularly, has used various strategies to 
frustrate any meaningful regional economic integration in West Africa and other sub-regions. This is because the 
erstwhile colonial masters stand to benefit from this balkanisation in the form of proliferation of regional groups 
and subgroups (Ake 1981). 
We, therefore, insist as we argue elsewhere that so long as African states are producing similar primary products 
which none of them needs from the other, multiple memberships and proliferation of regional economic 
organisations rather than tightening economic ties among African states will undermine regional economic 
integration in Africa (Aniche 2009, Okeke and Aniche 2012).  
Even when the subgroupings move or pull their member states into closer economic ties and further away from 
other non-subgroup members of the same regional economic communities, it is only channelling or linking their 
collective economies towards vertical economic integration with the industrialised developed countries of the 
West their erstwhile colonial masters. In the light of this, we presume that base on the facts on the ground, it is 
very unlikely that AEC would be able to realise its set out targets even with the prospect of Tripartite Free Trade 
Area (T-AFTA). 
 
7. Recommendations 
In seeking for solution to the predicament of African integration, we insist that the solution should not be sought 
in the existing Euro-centric strategies or theories, but in a new theory propounded by Aniche (2014) - a post-neo-
functionalism or a hybrid of neo-nationalism, post-nationalism and humanism - and apt or suitable for African 
situation and capable of solving its problems. We, also, noted that while classical functionalism and neo-
functionalism reify global supra-nationalism and regional supra-nationalism, respectively, as a starting point of 
integration, post-neo-functionalism or post-neo-nationalism problematises it and rather advocates that regional 
and global integration should proceed from national integration, thus, reifying nationalism as a step towards 
achieving regionalism and ultimately global integration or globalism.  
For Aniche (2014), post-neo-functionalism follows more or less the following stages: national integration, sub-
regional integration, regional integration, trans-regional integration and finally global integration. Post-neo-
functionalism is as well humanistic or humane because it advocates people-centred or human-centric or bottom-
up integration rather than top-down approach to integration, or state-centric or inter-governmental integration of 
classical functionalism and neo-functionalism. Therefore, integration should be people-driven or private-sector-
led rather than state-driven or public-sector-led. The role of the state should be regulatory or facilitative. 
A number of recommendations flows from this as embedded and embodied in post-neo-functionalism: (i) that 
African leaders should seriously commence with the task of national integration, nation-building and national 
development beyond rhetoric, and as such, as a strategy of eventually achieving regional integration in Africa (ii) 
as a corollary to the above, African leaders should desist from divisive politics of divide and rule or 
balkanisation and disintegrative nationalism; and work towards unleashing and synergising the collective 
energies of their people towards transforming the abundant and strategic mineral resources in their territories into 
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manufactured goods necessary for diversifying their economies from the present rentierism needed for 
transforming their current dependency on the industrialised countries of the West and their neo-colonial 
influences into relations of interdependency, and (iii) if they must relate with themselves since they enjoy all the 
fanfare, pomp and pageantries that are associated with it, it will be better to float a regional security organisation 
that will assist in the addressing the national questions that result to civil wars or strife and resolving wars in 
Africa (Aniche 2014). 
 
References 
Ake, C. (1981). A Political Economy of Africa. Ibadan: Longman Nigeria. 
Aniche, E.T. (2009). A Modern Introduction to Political Science. Onitsha: Desvic. 
Aniche, E.T. (2014). “Problematising Neo-functionalism in the Search for a New Theory of African Integration: 
The Case of the Proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA) in Africa”. Developing Country Studies, 4 (20), 
128-142. 
Aniche, E.T. (2015). “Post-neo-functionalism, Pan-Africanism and Regional Integration in Africa: Prospects and 
Challenges of the Proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (T-FTA)”. A Paper Presented at the Fifth Toyin Falola 
International Conference titled Toyin Falola Annual Conference on Africa and Africa in Diaspora (TOFAC). 
Held on July 2-4, 2015 at University of South Africa (UNISA), Pretoria, South Africa under the auspices of 
Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute (TMALI). 
Aniche, E.T., Okeke, V.O.S. and Ukaegbu, V.E. (2009). “Regional Economic Integration in Africa: A 
Comparative Study of ECOWAS and SADC”. International Journal of Africa Culture, Politics and 
Development, 4 (2), 82-101. 
Aniche, E.T. and Ukaegbu, V.E. (2014). “Vertical Integration, Economic Dependence and African Regionalism: 
A Comparative Study of ECOWAS and SADC”. ANSU Journal of Peace and Development Studies, 2 (1), 58-76. 
Burchill, S. and Linklater, A. (eds.). (2005). Theories of International Relations. New York: Palgrave. 
Echezona, N. (1998). International Politics in the Post-Cold War Era. Awka: Meks. 
Ejiofor, L. (1981). Africa in World Politics. Onitsha: Africana Educational. 
Ezeanyika, S. (2006). The Politics of Development Economy in the South: Problems and Prospects. Owerri: 
DESREG. 
Goldstein, J. and Pevehouse, J. (2008). International Relations. New York: Pearson Longman. 
Haas, E. (1970). “The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pre-theorising”. 
International Organisation, 24 (4), 607-646. 
Igwe, O. (2002). Politics and Globe Dictionary. Enugu: Jamoe. 
Kennes, W. (1999). “African Regional Economic Integration and the European Union”. In D. Bach (ed.) 
Regionalisation in Africa: Integration and Disintegration. Oxford: James Curry. 
Keohane, R. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Keohane, R. (2002). Power and Governance in a Partially Globalised World. London: Routledge. 
Keohane, R. and Martin, L. (1995). “The promise of institutionalist theory”. International Security, 20 (1), 39-
51. 
Keohane, R. and Nye, S. (1997). “Interdependence in World Politics”. In G. Crane and A. Amawi (eds.) 
Theoretical Evolution of International Political Economy: A Reader. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Nweke, A. (2000). “Functionalism and the New World Order: The Dwindling Options for Africa”. African 
Political Science Review (APSR), 1 (1), 24-49. 
Ojo, O. (1999). “Integration in ECOWAS: Successes and difficulties”. In D. Bach (ed.) Regionalisation in 
Africa: Integration and Disintegration. Oxford: James Curry. 
Okeke, V.O.S. and Aniche, E.T. (2012). “Economic Regionalism and Dependency in Africa: A Study of African 
Economic Community (AEC)”. Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review, 1 (11), 5-23. 
Okeke, V.O.S. and Aniche, E.T. (2013). “An analysis of European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN) 
Cooperation in Peacekeeping Missions”. Africa Peace Review, 11-12 (1), 1-22. 
Page, S. (2000). Regionalism among Developing Countries. London: Macmillan. 
   
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.36, 2015 
 
48 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Regional Economic Groups and Subgroups in Africa 
S/N Groups  Subgroups 
1. Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-
SAD) 
  
2. Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) 
  
3. East African Community (EAC)   
4. Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS/CEEAC) 
a. Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa 
(CEMAC) 
5. Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) 
a. 
 
 
b. 
West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (UEMOA) 
West African Monetary Zone 
(WAMZ) 
6. Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD)   
  
7. Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) 
a. Southern African Custom 
Union (SACU) 
8. Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA)   
Source: Okeke and Aniche (2012). 
 
Table 2: Comparison of AEC with other Regional Blocs 
Pillars 
regional blocs 
(REC) 
Area (Km2) Population GDP (PPP) 
In million 
($US) 
per capita 
Member 
states 
AEC 29,910,442 853,520,010 2,053,706 2,406 53 
ECOWAS 5,112,903 251,646,263 342,519 1,361 15 
ECCAS 6,667,421 121,245,958 175,928 1,451 11 
SADC 9,882,959 233,944,179 737,335 3,152 15 
EAC 1,817,945 124,858,568 104,239 1,065 5 
COMESA 12,873,957 406,102,471 735,599 1,811 20 
IGAD 5,233,604 187,969,775 225,049 1,197 7 
Western 
Sahara1 
266,000 273,008     ?   ? N/A2 
Other African 
blocs 
Area (km2) Population GDP (PPP) 
In million 
($ US) 
per capita 
Member 
states 
CEMAC3 3,020,142 34,970,529 85,136 2,435 6 
SACU3 2,693,418 51,055,878 541,433 10,605 5 
UEMOA3 3,505,375 80,865,222 101,640 1,257 8 
UMA4 5,782,140 84,185,073 491,276 5,836 5 
GAFTA5 5,876,960 166,259,603 635,450 3,822 5 
 
       
1The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) is a signatory to the AEC, but not 
participating in any bloc yet. 
          
2Majority under military occupation by Morocco; some territory administered by the 
SADR. 
          
3Economic bloc inside a pillar REC. 
          
4Proposed for pillar REC, but objecting participation. 
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5Non-African members of GAFTA are excluded from figures.  
Source: Culled from Aniche and Ukaegbu (2014). 
 
Table 3: Member States and Past Colonial Rulers of Regional Economic 
Communities in Africa 
 
ECCAS 
Subgroup 
Member States Past Colonial Rulers 
 
 
 
CEMAC 
Cameroon  
Central African Republic  
Chad  
Republic of the Congo  
Equatorial Guinea  
Gabon 
France 
France 
France 
France 
Spain 
France 
ECOWAS 
Subgroups 
Member States Past Colonial Rulers 
 
 
 
 
UEMOA 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Guinea-Bissau 
Mali  
Niger 
Senegal 
Togo  
France 
France 
France 
Portugal  
France 
France 
France 
France 
 
 
WAMZ 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Nigeria 
Sierra Leone 
Britain  
Britain 
France  
Britain 
Britain 
SADC 
Subgroup  
Member States Past Colonial Rulers 
 
 
SACU 
South Africa1 
Botswana  
Lesotho 
Namibia 
Swaziland2    
Britain  
Britain 
Britain 
South Africa 
Britain and South 
Africa 
 
1Initally colonized by Netherlands and later by Britain. 
 2Jointly colonized by Britain and South Africa. 
 Source: Okeke and Aniche (2012). 
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Table 7: Overlapping Memberships of African States in Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs)  
 
 
Source: Okeke and Aniche (2012). 
 
SADC COMESA EAC ECCAS CENSAD ECOWAS AMU IGAD 
Zimbabwe Zimbabwe       
Zambia Zambia       
Malawi Malawi       
Angola   Angola     
Swaziland Swaziland       
Tanzania  Tanzania      
Madagascar Madagascar       
Mauritius Mauritius       
Demo. Rep. 
of Congo 
Demo. Rep. 
of Congo 
 Demo. 
Rep. of 
Congo 
    
Seychelles Seychelles       
   Central 
African 
Rep. 
Central 
African Rep. 
   
 Eritrea   Eritrea   Eritrea 
 Djibouti   Djibouti   Djibouti 
 Burundi Burundi Burundi     
 Comoros   Comoros    
 Egypt   Egypt    
 Kenya Kenya  Kenya   Kenya 
 Libya     Libya  
 Rwanda  Rwanda Rwanda     
 Uganda Uganda     Uganda 
    Gambia Gambia   
    Senegal Senegal   
    Morocco  Morocco  
    Nigeria Nigeria   
    Tunisia  Tunisia  
    Benin Rep. Benin Rep.   
    Togo Togo   
    Cote 
d’Ivoire 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
  
    Guinea-
Bissau 
Guinea-
Bissau 
  
    Liberia Liberia   
    Ghana Ghana   
    Sierra Leone Sierra 
Leone 
  
    Guinea Guinea   
    Mauritania  Mauritania  
   Sao 
Tome 
and 
Principe 
Sao Tome 
and Principe 
   
 Ethiopia      Ethiopia 
Sudan       Sudan 
    Somalia   Somalia 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.36, 2015 
 
52 
 
 
Table 8: The Trade Profile of Kenya  
 
Source: Culled from Aniche and Ukaegbu (2014). 
 
Table 9: The Trade Profile of Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Culled from Aniche and Ukaegbu (2014). 
 
Table 10: The Trade Profile of Rwanda  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Culled from Aniche and Ukaegbu (2014). 
 
S/N Exports Main Destination % Imports Main Origin % 
1.  European Union (27) 26.6 1.  European Union (27) 20.2 
2. Uganda  12.2 2.   United Arab Emirates  14.8 
3. Tanzania  8.1 3.  India  9.4 
4. United States 7.0 4.   China 7.6 
5. Pakistan  4.9 5.    United States  7.4 
S/N Exports Main Destination % Imports Main Origin % 
1.  South Africa 37.4 1.  South Africa 42.8 
2. European Union (27) 16.5 2.  Botswana 11.4 
3. Mozambique  13.0 3.  European Union (27) 8.3 
4. Botswana  6.1 4.   China 5.7 
5. Switzerland  4.0 5.    Mozambique 4.8 
S/N Exports Main Destination % Imports Main Origin % 
1.  European Union (27) 35.6 1 European Union (27) 21.9 
2. Kenya 18.7 2.  Kenya 17.8 
3. Hong Kong, China 12.5 3.  Uganda  14.0 
4. Switzerland 7.3 4.   United Arab Emirates  7.8 
5. Congo, Dem. Rep. of 5.7 5.    Tanzania  6.8 
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